The marriage model due to Gale and Shapley and the assignment model due to Shapley and Shubik are standard in the theory of two-sided matching markets. We give a common generalization of these models by utilizing discrete concave functions and considering possibly bounded side payments.
Introduction
The marriage model due to Gale and Shapley [14] and the assignment model due to Shapley and Shubik [28] are standard in the theory of two-sided matching markets. The largest difference between these two models is that the former does not allow side payments or transferable utilities whereas the latter does (see Roth and Sotomayor [26] ).
Since Gale and Shapley's paper a large number of variations and extensions have been proposed. Recently, the marriage model was extended to frameworks in combinatorial optimization. Fleiner [9] extended the marriage model to the framework of matroids, and Eguchi, Fujishige and Tamura [5] extended this formulation to a more general one in terms of discrete convex analysis which was developed by Murota [20, 21, 22] . Alkan and Gale [2] and Fleiner [10] also generalized the marriage model to another wide frameworks. The existence of stable matchings in these models are guaranteed.
For the other standard model, the assignment model, Kelso and Crawford [18] proposed a seminal one-to-many variation in which a payoff function of each worker is strictly increasing (not necessarily linear) in a side payment, and a payoff function of each firm satisfies gross substitutability and is linear in a side payment.
They showed the existence of a stable outcome.
On the other hand, progress has been made toward unifying the marriage model and the assignment model. Crawford and Knoer [3] extended Gale and Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm for the marriage model to the assignment model. Kaneko [17] formulated a general model that includes the two by means of characteristic functions, and proved the nonemptiness of the core. Roth and Sotomayor [27] proposed a general model that also encompasses both and investigated the lattice property for payoffs. Eriksson and Karlander [6] proposed a hybrid model of the marriage model and the assignment model. In the ErikssonKarlander model, the set of agents is partitioned into two categories, one for "rigid" agents and the other for "flexible" agents. Rigid agents do not get side payments, that is, they behave like agents in the marriage model, while flexible agents behave like ones in the assignment model. Sotomayor [31] also further investigated this hybrid model and gave a non-constructive proof of the existence of a pairwise stable outcome. Fujishige and Tamura [12] proposed a generalization of the hybrid model due to Eriksson and Karlander [6] and Sotomayor [31] by utilizing M -concave functions which play a central role in discrete convex analysis.
The model in [12] motivates us to consider a more natural common generalization of the marriage model and the assignment model by utilizing discrete convex analysis. Our goal is to propose such a model which includes models due to Gale and Shapley [14] , Shapley and Shubik [28] , Eriksson and Karlander [6] , Sotomayor [31] , Fleiner [9] , Eguchi et al. [5] , and Fujishige and Tamura [12] as special cases, and to verify the existence of a pairwise stable outcome. The characteristic idea of our present model is to adopt a range of a side payment for each pair of agents instead of using the concept of rigid and flexible pairs. Our model can deal with rigidity and flexibility of pairs as ranges [0, 0] and (−∞, +∞) of side payments respectively as well as any ranges of side payments. This approach is more natural and adaptable than that adopting rigidity and flexibility. Furthermore, our proof for the existence of a pairwise stable outcome is simpler than that in our previous paper [12] .
As we will discuss in Section 2, gross substitutability and M -concavity are equivalent for set functions. It is our contribution in contrast to the results of Kelso and Crawford [18] that the existence of pairwise stable outcome is preserved in a many-to-many variation with quasi-linear workers' payoff functions as well as its extensions with multi-units of labor time and possibly bounded side payments.
Moreover, we give not only a general mathematical model but also a new concrete common generalization of the marriage and assignment models. We call it the assignment model with possibly bounded side payments, which is the simplest common generalization. It seems that this model has not been studied in the literature. The existence of a pairwise stable outcome of this model is a direct consequence of our main result.
The present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains M -concavity together with some examples and gives its nice properties and several useful lemmas from the viewpoint of mathematical economics. Section 3 describes our general model and two concepts of stability, namely "pairwise stability" and "pairwise strict stability," discusses relations between these two concepts, and gives our main theorem about the existence of pairwise stable outcomes. Proofs of preliminary lemmas and theorems are put in Section 6, and a proof of our main theorem is given in Section 5. Section 4 discusses relations between several existing models and our general model. In Section 5 we present an algorithm for finding a pairwise strictly stable outcome and prove its correctness, which shows our main theorem about the existence of a pairwise stable outcome. In Section 6 we give proofs of the lemma and theorems appearing in Section 3. Section 7 gives future work and open problems.
M -concavity
In this section we explain the concept of M -concave function, which plays a central role in discrete convex analysis (see [22] for details). Let E be a nonempty finite set, and let 0 be a new element not in E. We denote by Z the set of integers, and by Z E the set of integral vectors x = (x(e) | e ∈ E) indexed by E, where x(e)
denotes the e-component of vector x. Also, R and R E denote the set of reals and of real vectors indexed by E, respectively. Let 0 and 1 be vectors of all zeros and all ones of an appropriate dimension. We define the positive support supp
and the negative support supp
For each S ⊆ E, we denote by χ S the characteristic vector of S defined by: χ S (e) = 1 if e ∈ S and χ S (e) = 0 otherwise, and write simply χ e instead of χ {e} for all e ∈ E. We also define χ 0 as the zero vector in Z black points or that of white points is greater than or equal to that of x and y.
((M ) is denoted by (−M -EXC) in Murota [22] .) Condition (M ) says that the sum of the function values at two points does not decrease as the points symmetrically move one or two step closer to each other on the set of integral lattice points of Z E (see Figure 1 ). This is a discrete analogue of the fact that for an ordinary concave function the sum of the function values at two points does not decrease as the points symmetrically move closer to each other on the straight line segment and the equivalence between the single improvement condition and M -concavity for set functions was by Fujishige and Yang [13] . Moreover, M -concavity can be characterized by these properties or their extensions under a natural assumption (see Danilov, Koshevoy and Lang [4] and Murota and Tamura [25] for details).
Fujishige and Tamura [12] showed that an M -concave function satisfies the following properties.
exists x 2 such that
exists x 1 such that
Suppose that E denotes a set of workers, y ∈ Z E a labor allocation representing labor times of the workers, f (y) a valuation of a firm for labor allocation y, and
vectors representing capacities of labor times. Property (S1) says that when each capacity decreases or remains the same, there exists an optimal labor allocation such that for every worker, if his/her original labor time is less than or equal to the new capacity, then the labor time increases or remains the same, and if the original labor time is greater than the new capacity, then the labor time becomes equal to the new capacity. On the other hand, (S2) says that when each capacity increases or remains the same, there exists an optimal labor allocation such that for every worker, if his/her original labor time is less than its original capacity, then the labor time decreases or remains the same.
Hence, (S1) and (S2) imply that a choice function C : Z C always gives a singleton (in this case (S1) and (S2) are equivalent), then (S1) and (S2) are equivalent to persistence (substitutability) in Alkan and Gale [2] .
Farooq and Tamura [8] showed that f : . Farooq and Shioura [7] extended these characterizations to the case where dom f is bounded.
The maximizers of an M -concave function have a good characterization as follows.
Theorem 2.1 (Murota [20, 21] , Murota and Shioura [23] ): For an M -concave func-
The set of all maximizers of an M -concave function is called a g-polymatroid in Z E (see [11] ), which is also called an M -convex set in [22] . M -convex sets have the following property. 
The following lemmas also show some basic properties of M -concave functions, which will be useful in Sections 5 and 6.
Lemma 2.3 (Fujishige and Tamura [12] ):
Then, the following two statements hold:
such that
Lemma 2.3 says that when the capacity of the labor time of one worker decreases (or increases) by one, an optimal allocation can be obtained from the current optimal allocation by changing the labor times of at most two workers.
Lemma 2.4 (Fujishige and Tamura [12] ):
Lemma 2.4 says that any capacity larger than the corresponding labor time can be made arbitrarily large without destroying the optimality of the given optimal labor allocation.
Model description
We consider a two-sided market consisting of disjoint sets P and Q of agents, in which an agent in P may be called a worker and one in Q a firm. Each worker i ∈ P can supply multi-units of labor time, and each firm j ∈ Q can employ workers with multi-units of labor time and pay a salary to worker i if j hires i.
We assume possibly bounded side payments, i.e., each pair (i, j) may have lower and upper bounds on a salary per unit of labor time. We also assume that the valuation of each agent k ∈ P ∪ Q on labor allocations is described by a function in monetary terms. We will examine two concepts of stability, namely, pairwise stability and pairwise strict stability, in a market where the payoff function of each agent is quasi-linear. We will give precise definitions of the two concepts later.
First we describe our model mathematically. Let E = P × Q, i.e., the set of all ordered pairs (i, j) of agents i ∈ P and j ∈ Q. Also define E (i) = {i} × Q for all i ∈ P and E (j) = P × {j} for all j ∈ Q. Denoting by x(i, j) the number of units of labor time for which j hires i, we represent a labor allocation by vector
. We express lower and upper bounds of salaries per unit of labor time by two vectors π ∈ (R ∪ {−∞})
and k ∈ P ∪ Q, we denote by y (k) the restriction of y on E (k) . For example, for a labor allocation x ∈ Z E , x (k) represents the labor allocation of agent k with respect to x. We assume that the valuation of each worker on a labor allocation is determined only by how many units of labor time he/she works in the firms, and that the valuation of each firm is determined only by how many units of labor time it hires the workers. That is, the value function
We assume that each value function f k satisfies the following assumption:
(A) dom f k is bounded and hereditary, and has 0 as the minimum point, where heredity means that for any y, 
for all (i, j) ∈ E. We call a pair (x, s) of a feasible allocation x ∈ Z E and a feasible salary vector s ∈ R E an outcome.
The payoff functions of agents on outcomes are defined as follows: the payoff of
the value of i on x plus the income from the firms that hire worker i, and the payoff
i.e., the value of firm j on x minus the payments to the workers that firm j hires.
An outcome (x, s) is said to satisfy incentive constraints if each agent has no incentive to unilaterally decrease the current units x of labor time at the current salary agreements s, that is, if it satisfies
Next we define pairwise (un)stability formally. For any s ∈ R E , α ∈ R, i ∈ P , and j ∈ Q, let (s (j) , α) be similarly defined. We say that an outcome (x, s) is pairwise unstable if it does not satisfy incentive constraints or there exist
For some feasible salary α between i and j, conditions (3.3) and (3.4) .2) hold and for all i ∈ P , j ∈ Q and α ∈ R with
Conditions (3.8) and (3.9) is equivalent to that for each pair (i, j) ∈ E and each feasible salary between them, both i and j cannot strictly increase their payoffs without increasing labor times with other partners.
The next example illustrates a gap between pairwise stability and pairwise strict stability.
Example 3: Let us consider the case where E = {(i, j)} (a singleton),
and π(i, j) = 0 and π(i, j) = 1/4. In this case, an outcome (x, s) = (2, 0) is not
However, the outcome is pairwise stable. On the other hand, an outcome (x, s) = (2, 1/4) is pairwise strictly stable (and hence, pairwise stable).
The concept of a pairwise strictly stable outcome may be regarded as artificial but, as can be seen from Lemma 3.1, pairwise strict stability coincides with pairwise stability in some useful special cases: (i) salaries are constant, and (ii) each worker-firm pair can be matched at most once. These two cases comprise many known existing models such as the marriage model due to Gale and Shapley [14] , the assignment model due to Shapley and Shubik [28] , and an extension [5] of the marriage model with M -concave value functions on Z E (also see the assignment model with possibly bounded side payments to be considered in Section 4).
-concave functions satisfying (A) and if one of the following conditions
holds, then any pairwise stable outcome is pairwise strictly stable.
Proof. See Section 6.1.
Although the concepts of pairwise stability and pairwise strict stability are different in our general model, we have the following theorem. 
Theorem 3.2: Assume that f k is an M -concave function satisfying (A) for each
10)
Moreover, for any x, p, z P , and z Q satisfying the above conditions, (x, p) is a pairwise strictly stable outcome.
Proof. See Section 6.2.
We note that M -concavity in Theorem 3.4 is not required to show the if part,
while it is required to show the only-if part.
Consider the case where z P (i, j) = +∞ and z Q (i, j) < +∞. Condition (3.10) implies that worker i has no incentive to increase x(i, j) at the current salary. If firm j could strictly increase its payoff by increasing x(i, j) at the current salary, then j would try to increase the salary of worker i to give worker i incentive to increase x(i, j). Condition (3.14), however, implies that firm j is in an extreme situation where firm j cannot increase the current i's salary any more, i.e., p(i, j) = π(i, j), and that firm j must give up increasing x(i, j) (and hence z Q (i, j) is put to be a finite value). Analogously, when z P (i, j) < +∞ and z Q (i, j) = +∞,
Conditions (3.11) and (3.13) imply that if worker i must give up increasing x(i, j),
then firm j has no incentive to increase x(i, j) at the current salary and i is in an extreme situation where worker i cannot decrease his/her current salary to give firm j incentive to hire more units of labor time x(i, j). It is of importance that (3.10)∼(3.14) give a decentralized characterization of a pairwise (strictly) stable allocation. That is, given appropriate vectors p, z P and z Q , a pairwise (strictly) stable allocation can be obtained by individually maximizing each agent's payoff.
To prove our main theorem (Theorem 3.3) in Section 5, it is convenient to use two aggregated M -concave functions on Z E , one for each of P and Q. Let us define f P and f Q by
Since E (i) and
all functions f j (j ∈ Q) are. Moreover, the following lemma obviously holds. In Section 5 we will give an algorithm for finding a pairwise strictly stable outcome (x, p) and prove its validity, which will complete the proof of Theorem 3.6
and hence Theorem 3.3. 
Here, for simplicity we neglect time required for moving from one firm to another.
Related models
In this section we discuss models that are closely related to our model.
Marriage model and assignment model
We briefly explain that our model includes the marriage model due to Gale and Shapley [14] and the assignment model due to Shapley and Shubik [28] as special cases. In these models, we are given pairs (
Here, in the assignment model a ij and b ij are interpreted as profits of i and j when i and j are matched, while in the marriage model a ij and b ij define preferences as: i ∈ P prefers j 1 to j 2 if a ij 1 > a ij 2 , and i is indifferent
We assume that a ij > 0 if j is acceptable to i, and a ij = −∞ otherwise, and b ij > 0 if i is acceptable to j, and b ij = −∞ otherwise. A matching is a subset of E such that every agent appears at most once. Given a matching
(resp. i ∈ P ) with (i, j) ∈ X. In the marriage model, a matching X is called
In the assignment model, an outcome which is a triple (q, r; X) consisting of payoff
, and a subset X ⊆ E, is called pairwise stable if
Define functions f i for all i ∈ P and f j for all j ∈ Q by
It can easily be shown that the above functions are M -concave. We can show that, by putting π = π = 0, pairwise stability in our model coincides with pairwise 
The assignment model with possibly bounded side payments
In the assignment model, for each (i, j) ∈ X, s ij = q i − a ij = b ij − r j denotes a transfer (or a side payment) from j to i. In a labor allocation case, it would not be practical to consider that a firm can pay an arbitrarily large amount of money to a worker as a salary or that a worker receives a negative salary (of arbitrary large absolute value). Hence we introduce possible bounds on side payments like in our general model.
Let us consider an extension of the assignment model in which, given two
We say that an outcome (q, r; X) is pairwise stable if (b1) X is a matching,
We 
for each i ∈ P and
for each j ∈ Q, where λ i and µ j denote capacities on labor times of agents. As is seen in Example 2, the functions defined by (4.3) and (4.4) are M -concave. Hence, our model also includes the many-to-many variation of the assignment model with possibly bounded side payments.
A labor allocation model with several categories of workers
We consider a labor allocation model without bounds on side payments in which each worker can supply one unit of labor-time and each firm can employ several workers, i.e., a one-to-many case. We further assume that there are several categories of workers, e.g., engineers, cashiers, secretaries, and so on. Mathematically, the set P of workers is partitioned into P For any x ∈ Z E , t ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, and j ∈ Q let x (t) (j) denote the restriction of x on P t × {j} and δ j be the function defined by
Here each f j is M -concave as shown in Example 2, and gives an appropriate valuation of j satisfying its total capacity of workers.
By the discussion in Section 2, the model due to Kelso and Crawford [18] includes the one-to-many labor allocation model with several categories of workers without bounds on side payments, where a payoff function of each firm satisfies gross substitutability and is linear in salary and a payoff function of each worker is strictly increasing (not necessarily linear). On the other hand, our model can deal with the many-to-many variation in which a payoff function of each agent satisfies gross substitutability and is linear in salary, and furthermore, its extension with multiplicity of units of labor time and with possibly bounded side payments. This is one of the merits of our model in contrast to the seminal model by Kelso and
Crawford [18] .
While the above-mentioned model is an extension of the assignment model, similar extensions of the marriage model have been discussed in [1, 5, 9] . Our general model also includes these models as special cases.
Hybrid models
Eriksson and Karlander [6] and Sotomayor [31] proposed a hybridization of the marriage and assignment models. Their idea is to partition agents into two categories: rigid agents and flexible agents. Rigid agents do not get side payments, that is, they behave like agents in the marriage model, while flexible agents behave like ones in the assignment model. Fujishige and Tamura [12] generalized these models by using M -concave functions. In their model, two M -concave functions
, and an arbitrary partition (F, R) of E are given. For a vector d on E and S ⊆ E, let d| S denote the restriction of d on
We can show that f P f Q -pairwise stability is equivalent to our pairwise strict stability in the case where π(e) = π(e) = 0 for all e ∈ R, and π(e) = −∞ and π(e) = +∞ for all e ∈ F . Thus, Theorem 3.6 implies the existence of an f P f Qpairwise stable outcome in the hybrid model in [12] . This means that our model also includes many existing models (see [12] for details).
An algorithm for finding a pairwise strictly stable outcome
We assume that given M -concave functions
Assumption (A ). The problem of finding a pairwise strictly stable outcome is rewritten as that of finding
1)
2)
e ∈ E, z P (e) < +∞ ⇒ p(e) = π(e), z Q (e) = +∞, (5.5)
e ∈ E, z Q (e) < +∞ ⇒ p(e) = π(e), z P (e) = +∞. (5.6)
In this section, we give an algorithm that finds x P , x Q , p, z P , and z Q satisfying (5.1)∼(5.6). The algorithm may be recognized as one of auction algorithms.
Roughly speaking, its strategy is to initially put p as large as possible so that there exist x P , x Q , z P and z Q satisfying (5.2)∼(5.6) and several extra conditions such as x Q ≤ x P , and then to monotonically decrease p preserving these conditions so that (5.1) is eventually satisfied. A characteristic feature of the algorithm is to use a sophisticated procedure for decreasing p, due to the technique of network flow algorithms (see (Case 2) below). On the other hand, when specialized to a marriage model, the algorithm can find a pairwise stable matching of the marriage model. This means that the algorithm also retains an essence of the deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley [14] . The deferred acceptance algorithm is generalized as a procedure of updating z P and z Q , which relies on Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4 (see (Case 1) below). Now, we describe our algorithm. Initially, we put p as
where b is a sufficiently large positive integer to be specified later. by setting b to be a large enough integer so that x Q (e) = 0 for all e ∈ E with π(e) = +∞, we have
From Assumption (A ), such a b exists. By Lemma 2.4, (5.3) is preserved even if z Q (e) is set to +∞ for every e ∈ E with p(e) = π(e) and x Q (e) < x P (e). Thus we can assume that the following condition is satisfied:
e ∈ E, z Q (e) < +∞ =⇒ x Q (e) = x P (e) = z Q (e). (5.8)
Our aim is to modify vectors x P , x Q , p, z P , and z Q preserving (5.2)∼(5.8) and eventually to attain (5.1).
We now assume that we are given vectors x P , x Q , p, z P and z Q satisfying (5.2)∼(5.8) but not (5.1). Let L and U be subsets of E defined by
It follows from (5.6) and (5.8) that for all e ∈ U we have p(e) = π(e) and x Q (e) =
x P (e) = z Q (e). Note that L and U may have a common element e with π(e) = π(e).
We divide our argument into two parts that treat: (Case 1) there exists e ∈ L with x Q (e) < x P (e); (Case 2) the other case.
In (Case 1), we will modify x P , x Q , z P and z Q while keeping p the same. Let e be an element of L with x Q (e) < x P (e). From (5.8), we have z Q (e) = +∞, and hence, we can assume z P (e) = x P (e) while preserving (5.2) and (5.5). We Next we consider (Case 2), where x Q (e) = x P (e) for all e ∈ L. In this case, we modify p as well as x P , x Q , and z Q (while we keep z P the same). The procedure given below is based on a successive shortest path algorithm for finding a maximizer of the sum of two M -concave functions (Moriguchi and Murota [19] , also see Iwata et al. [16] ). We deal with two functions defined by
).
(5.11)
Obviously, f ≤ P and f ≤ Q are also M -concave, and x P ∈ arg max f
We construct a directed graph G = ({0} ∪ E, A) and an arc length function : A → R as follows. Arc set A consists of two disjoint parts: (5.14)
We note that there always exists a path from S to T because (e, 0) ∈ A P for all e ∈ S by (A ). Let P be a shortest path from S to T with the minimum number of arcs. We define δ by The above system of inequalities is equivalent to
which is further equivalent to
due to Theorem 2.1. We show that p + ∆p satisfies (5.4). Since ∆p ≤ 0, it is enough to show that π(e) ≤ p(e) + ∆p(e) for all e ∈ E. It follows from (5.15) that for all e ∈ E we have
p(e) + ∆p(e) = min {p(e) + d(e) − δ, p(e)} ≥ min {p(e) + d(e) − (p(e) + d(e) − π(e)), p(e)} = π(e).
Thus, x P , x Q , p + ∆p, z P , and z Q satisfy Conditions (5.2)∼(5.8).
The above calculation shows that if δ < (P), then there exists e ∈ E with p(e) > p(e) + ∆p(e) = π(e), that is, L is enlarged. We next deal with the case where δ = (P). Suppose δ = (P). Note that for each arc a = (e, e ) ∈ A, (a) = (a) + ∆p(e) − ∆p(e ) is the length of a in the directed graph defined in the same way as above for f
], x P , and x Q . Since δ = (P), we have (a) = 0 for all arcs a ∈ P. Therefore, we have
(∀(e, e ) ∈ P ∩ A P ),
Since P has the minimum number of arcs, we have
for all vertices e and e of P such that (e, e ) ∈ P and e appears earlier than e in P. Furthermore, arcs of A P and A Q appear alternately in P. For otherwise, assume that two consecutive arcs (e, e ), (e , e ) ∈ P belong to A P and then, by repeatedly using (M ) we have
which yields (e, e ) + (e , e ) ≥ (e, e ).
( 5.20) This contradicts the minimality of the number of arcs in P. Consequently, we have If e ∈ U , then we put z Q (e ) := +∞. In the same way as in the argument for (Case 1), this modification yields (5.8) while preserving the other conditions.
Summarizing the above argument, we describe an algorithm Pairwise Stable.
We will show that it terminates in a finite number of iterations and finds a pairwise strictly stable outcome.
Algorithm Pairwise Stable
Step 0. Find x P , x Q , p, z P , and z Q satisfying (5.2)∼(5.8).
Step 1.
Step 2. Set L and U as (5.9) and (5.10). If there exists e ∈ L with x Q (e) < x P (e) then go to Step 3.a; else go to Step 4.a.
Step 3.a. Set z P (e) := x P (e) − 1 and x P := x P − χ e + χ e , where e is an element such that (5.2) is satisfied by the updated x P and z P .
3.b.
If e ∈ U then go to Step 1; else go to Step 5.
Step 4.a. Construct G and compute for f 
4.d.
If the last arc of P is in A Q then put z Q (e ) := +∞ and go to Step 1; else go to Step 5.
Step 5. Set z Q := z Q + χ e and x Q := x Q + χ e − χ e , where e is an element such that (5.3) holds. If e ∈ U then set z Q (e ) := +∞. Go to Step 1.
We have already shown the following lemma. Proof. (a): At the beginning of Step 3.a, we have z P (e) ≥ x P (e). Hence, z P (e) strictly decreases at Step 3.a.
(b): As we have already shown, L strictly enlarges when δ < (P).
(c): In this case, we have either e = 0 or e ∈ L \ U . In the former case e∈E (x P (e) − x Q (e)) is decreased by one. Since x Q (e) = x P (e) for all e ∈ L ∪ U at the beginning of Step 4, we have x P (e ) > x Q (e ) for e (∈ L) at the end of Step 4.c, which results in (a) in the next iteration. Proof. Since f P and f Q satisfy (A ), we have
) is nonnegative and bounded from above,
• if z P (e) < +∞ then it is nonnegative and bounded from above,
• if z Q (e) < +∞ then it is bounded from above by (5.8). [29, 32] . In our case we can define 
Proofs
In this section we give proofs of Lemma 3.1, Theorems 3.4 and 3.2 in this order.
A proof of Lemma 3.1
It is enough to show that if an outcome (x, s) is pairwise quasi-unstable, then it is also pairwise unstable. Let (x, s) be a pairwise quasi-unstable outcome. We may assume that (x, s) satisfies incentive constraints (3.1) and (3.2). Then there exist
We first deal with Case (i). In this case, s(i, j) = α holds. Because (x, s) satisfies incentive constraints, we have y (i, j) > x(i, j) and y (i, j) > x(i, j). In addition, we assume that y (i, j) and y (i, j), respectively, are as small as possible among vectors satisfying (3.3)∼(3.6). By (M ) for y and
Since 
hold. Hence, y (i, j) must be greater than x(i, j), so that y (i, j) ≥ 2. Therefore, it is sufficient to deal with Case (iii). Replace y by 
Condition (3.12) is satisfied by p because s is feasible.
We also define z P and z Q by
It follows from pairwise strict stability of (x, s) that z P (i, j) = +∞ or z Q (i, j) = +∞ holds. We consider the case where z P (i, j) < +∞. In this case, there exists
We show (3.13) . Suppose, to the contrary, that p(i, j) > π(i, j). If x(i, j) > 0, then for a sufficiently small number > 0 we have Finally, we show (3.10) ((3.11) can be shown similarly). Suppose that (3.10) does not hold, i.e., for some i ∈ P there exists y ∈ arg max{f i [+p (i) 
(3.1) implies the existence of e ∈ E (i) with y (e) > x (i) (e). By (M ), there exists
By the definition of y , we have
The above two inequalities imply
yields that z P (e) = x (i) (e), by (6.2) . This contradicts y ≤ z (i) . Hence (3.10) holds.
The if part:
E be vectors satisfying (3.10)∼(3.14). We put s = p. We show that (x, s) is pairwise strictly stable. Since
for all k ∈ P ∪ Q, Conditions (3.1) and (3.2) are direct consequences of (3.10) and (3.11) . Suppose, to the contrary, that there exist
and
By (3.10) and since y ≥ 0, Condition (6.4) implies that either (Case 1)
Similarly, by (3.11) and (6.5), we have either (Case 3) Let N = (G, ) be a network with a directed graph G = ({0} ∪ E, A) and an arc length function : A → R, where the arc set A of G is the union of the following two sets
A P = {(e, e ) | e, e ∈ {0} ∪ E, e = e , x − χ e + χ e ∈ dom f P }, A Q = {(e, e ) | e, e ∈ {0} ∪ E, e = e , x + χ e − χ e ∈ dom f Q } (6.6) and the length function is defined by
with f P and f Q being defined by (3.15) .
By the pairwise stability of (x, s) we have the following claim. If e = 0 or e = (i, j ) for some j ∈ Q, then (a) < 0 means
Also consider the other case where e = 0 and e = (i , j ) for some i ( = i) ∈ P and j ∈ Q. By the incentive constraints for (x, s), we have
which together with (a) < 0 implies (6.8).
Similarly, it follows from (a ) < 0 that
Inequalities (6.8) and (6.9) contradict the pairwise stability of (x, s). 
where y = x − χ e + χ e and y = x + χ e − χ e . This contradicts the pairwise stability of (x, s).
We initially put p = s, z P = z Q = (+∞, · · · , +∞), and modify them as follows.
For each pair of consecutive arcs a = (e, e ) ∈ A P and a = (e , e ) ∈ A Q with (a) + (a ) < 0, if (a) < 0 then we set z P (e ) := x(e ) and p(e ) := π(e ), and if (a ) < 0 then we set z Q (e ) := x(e ) and p(e ) := π(e ). We define subsets L and
It follows from Claim 6.3.A that L and U are disjoint. We update network N = (G, ) by (6.6) and (6.7) with f P , f Q and s being replaced by f First, we deal with any arc a = (0, e ) of type (2) . Since (x, s) satisfies incentive constraints, we have
This inequality is preserved when s is replaced by p, because p(e ) ≤ s(e ), and hence, (a) ≥ 0. Next, consider any arc a = (e , 0) of type (1) . Since e ∈ L, there exists a vertex e ∈ {0} ∪ E such that
where the first inequality follows from the definition of L and Claim 6.3.A. By (M ) and incentive constraints for (x, s), we have
From (6.10) and (6.11) we obtain (
π(e )) ≥ 0. Similarly, we can also show the nonnegativity of the lengths of arcs of types (3) and (4). repeat modifying p, z P , z Q and S as described below. Since each modification results in enlarging S ⊆ {0} ∪ E, after at most |E| repetitions we eventually get an S such that (3.16) and (3.17) hold with x , due to Claim 6.3.C, and this will complete the proof of Theorem 3.2.
For each e ∈ E \ S we consider the following three cases:
(1) there exists an arc a = (e, e ) ∈ A P with (a) < 0, show that Claim 6.3.B holds for updated N , it is enough to verify that in updated N we have (a 1 ) + (a 2 ) ≥ 0 for any consecutive two arcs a 1 = (e , e 1 ) ∈ A P and a 2 = (e 1 , e 2 ) ∈ A Q . By M -concavity, we have (a * ) + (a 1 ) + (a 2 ) ≥ (e 0 , e 1 ) + (a 2 ) ≥ 0 (6.12) in old N , where the second inequality follows from Claim 6.3.B for old N . The sum (a 1 ) + (a 2 ) in updated N is greater than or equal to the left-hand side of (6.12). We thus see that Claim 6.3.B holds for updated N . Also, Claim 6.3.D obviously holds for updated N .
Finally, we deal with Case (2) . In this case, we modify p(e ) as p(e ) := p(e ) − max{min{ (a ) | a = (e , e ) ∈ A Q }, p(e ) − π(e )}, and, if min{ (a ) | a = (e , e ) ∈ A Q } < p(e ) − π(e ) then we set z Q (e ) := x(e ) and update network N for new z Q . After this modification, we put S := S ∪ {e }.
In the same way as the proof for Case (1), we can show that updated N and S satisfy Claims 6.3.B, 6.3.C and 6.3.D.
Concluding remarks
We have proposed a general two-sided matching market model with possibly 
